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ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Whether Connecticut’s Megan’s Law, which disseminates truthful information 
about convicted sex offenders without commenting on their current 
dangerousness, violates the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution’s 
Fourteenth Amendment.
2. Whether Alaska’s Megan’s Law, w'hich seeks to protect the public by requiring 
convicted sex offenders to register with the state so that the public may access 
information about them, violates the U.S. Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause.
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OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Second Circuit can be found at Doe v. Dent, of Pub. Safety, 271 F.3d 
38 (2d Cir. 2001), and the opinion of the Ninth Circuit can be found at Doe 1 v. Otte, 259 F,3d 
979 (9th Cir. 2001).
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides. “No State shall. . . 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. Const, amend. 
XIV. The Ex Post Facto Clause provides that “[n]o State shall... pass any ... ex post facto 
Law . ...” U.S. Const, art. I, § 10.
The relevant statutory provisions are Connecticut General Statutes sections 54-250 et seq. 
(2001) ("Connecticut’s Megan’s Law’'), and Alaska Statutes sections 12.63.010-12.63.100 
(LEXIS L. Publg. 2001) (“Alaska’s Megan’s Law”).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court reviews questions of law de noxo. l'3der v. Holloway. 510 U.S. 510. 516
(1994).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Preliminary Statement
This appeal concerns two cases regarding the constitutionality of sex offender registration 
acts that originated in the states of Connecticut and Alaska. (Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 61, 195.) 
This Court consolidated the cases upon granting certiorari. (J.A. at 230.)
I. Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe.
On February 22,1999, Plaintiff John Doe (“Respondent") filed a complaint in the U.S. 
District Coui1 for the District of Connecticut on behalf ol himsell and all others similarly situated
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under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, claiming that Connecticut’s Megan’s Law violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment and Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution. (J.A. at 1, 63.) Respondent 
named as defendants Dr. Henry C. Lee, Commissioner of Connecticut Department of Public 
Safely; William Carbone, Director of Adult Probation and the Court Support Services Division 
of the Judicial Department; and John Armstrong, Commissioner of the Connecticut Department 
of Correction (collectively “the State”). (J.A. at 1.)
Respondent, a convicted sex offender, complains that registration requirements and 
dissemination of publicly available information regarding him and other convicted sex offenders 
unfairly stigmatizes them and deprives them of liberty and property interests, in violation of their 
riuhts to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. (J.A. at 19.) Respondent further claims 
that because his and other sex offenders’ convictions occurred prior to the enactment of 
('onneelicut's Megan’s Law. they are not subject to its provisions pursuant to the Ex Post Facto 
( lause of the U.S. Constitution. (J.A. at 20.) The State denies that Connecticut's Megan's Law 
\ iolates cither the Due Process Clause or the Ex Post Facto Clause, but instead is a common- 
sense response arising from a nationwide concern about sex offenders and parents’ desire to 
know who is living and working in their neighborhood. (J.A. at 81.)
On March 31,2001, the district court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment 
on the ex post facto claim, finding that the legislature did not enact the law with punitive intent 
and that its effects are not so punishing as to render it punitive in fact. (J.A. at 25.) The district 
court also granted Respondent’s motion for summary judgment as to his due process claim. (J.A. 
at 25.) On May 18, 2001, the district court issued a permanent injunction, barring public 
disclosure and dissemination of the infonnation contained on a website - including convicted sex 
offenders’ names, addresses, photographs and other identifying information. (J.A. at 55.) That
same day, the State appealed the ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.
(J.A. at 73.) Respondent subsequently appealed the district court’s ruling on his ex post facto 
claim. (J.A. at 75.) On October 19, 2001, the court of appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling 
as to both claims. (J.A. at 81.) On May 20, 2002, this Court granted certiorari. (J.A. at 108.)
2. Otte V. Doe I.
On May 13, 1994, Jolin Doe I, John Doe II, and Jane Doe. wife of John Doe I,
(collectively “Respondents”) filed a complaint with the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Alaska under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, claiming that Alaska’s Megan’s Law violates federal and 
state constitutional rights. (J.A. at 109, 143-44.) Respondents named as defendants Ronald O. 
Otte, Commissioner of the Alaska Department of Public Safety, and Bruce M. Bothelo. Alaska 
Attorney General (collectively “the State”), both in their ofilcial and individual capacities. (J.A.
at no.)
Respondents John Doe I and John Doe II, both convicted of .sexual felonies with minors, 
alleged that Alaska’s Megan’s Law violates their civil rights afforded by the U.S. Constitution. 
(J.A. at 143.) Respondents claimed Alaska’s Megan’s Law: (1) violates the Contracts Clause- 
Article I, section 10; (2) denies due process and equal protection guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment; (3) is an ex post facto law prohibited by Article I. .section 10: (4) constitutes an 
unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by the Fourth Amendment; and (5) invades their right 
to privacy.' (J.A. at 143.)
On March 21, 1999, the district court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment 
on the ex post facto claim, noting that Alaska’s Megan’s Law is not punitive in its intent or in its 
effect. (J.A. at 168.) The district court also granted the State's motions for summary judgment
' Jane Doe's allegations are unrelated to the ex post facto issue raised on appeal. (J.A. at 143.)
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on the claims pertaining to modification of a prior contract, federal right to privacy, federal due 
process, and pendant state law claims. (J.A. at 185.)
The district court dismissed Respondents' claims with prejudice on August 13, 1999.
(J.A. at 192.) Respondents appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit that same day. (J.A. at 204.) On April 9, 2001, the court of appeals reversed and 
remanded the district court's ruling, addressing only the ex post facto claim. (J.A. at 212.) On 
I'ebruary 19, 2002, this Court granted certiorari. (J.A. at 229.)
Statement of Facts
1. Megan’s Law.
In July 1994, a 7-ycar-old New Jersey girl named Megan Kanka was raped and murdered 
by a twice-convicted sex offender who. unbeknownst to Megan’s family, lived in their 
neighborhood. Megan’s death prompted a nationwide call for better tracking of sex offenders 
and better dissemination of information so that parents can better protect their children. See 
Matthew Daly. Family Sees Sex Offender Bill Signed: Megan’s Law a Reality. Hartford Courant 
A3 (May 31,1995). Although New Jersey enacted the original statute, today all 50 states have 
adopted some version of Megan's Law to avoid losing out on vital federal crime-fighting funds 
under the federal Jacob Wcttcrling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender 
Regi.stration Program. See Kellie A. Wagner, High Court Takes Up Megan’s Law, Conn. L.
Trib. 1 (May 27, 2002). The nationwide implementation of Megan’s Laws by state and federal 
legislatures underscores the importance of public policy goals that monitor sex ofTenders through 
registration and notification statutes that inform law enforcement and the general public of 
c(mviclcd sex offenders within their midst.
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2. Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe.
In 1998 and 1999, the Connecticut General Assembly revised its version of Megan’s 
in order to continue receiving federal crime-fighting funds. (J.A. at 26.) The federal law, 42 
U.S.C. section 14071, requires that states maintain a registry of convicted sex offenders and 
release the information to law enforcement and the public as necessary to ensure public safety. 
(J.A. at 26, 27.) Connecticut’s Megan's Law requires registration for four specified categories: 
criminal offenses against a victim who is a minor, sexually violent offenses, felonies committe(j 
for a sexual purpose, and nonviolent sexual offenses. Sec Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-251,54-252, 
54-254. Individuals convicted of sexually violent offenses must update their registry informatioj^ 
every ninety days; other registrants only have to update their information annually. (J.A. at 11.)
The law provides for a user-friendly website rcgistr>' that allows the public to search th^ 
convicted sex offender database by using a name, city or zip code. (J.A. at 30.) The \\ebsite 
specifies that individuals are included in the registry because they have been convicted of a 
qualifying offense. (J.A. at 31.) Information contained on the website makes it clear the State 
has not determined whether registrants are currently dangerous, but is pro\'iding the registry as a 
public ser\4ce. (J.A. at 31.) The website admonishes visitors against using the information to 
harass the listed individuals. (J.A. at 31.) The first page of the website registry includes the 
following message:
The registry is based on the legislature’s decision to facilitate access to 
publicly-available [sic] information about persons convicted of sexual 
offenses. The Department of Public Safety has not considered or assessed 
the specific risk of reoffense [sic] with regard to any indi\ idual prior to his 
or her inclusion within this registry, and has made no determination that 
any individual included in the registry is currently dangerous. Individuals 
included within the registry are included solely by virtue of their 
conviction record and state law. The main purpose of providing this data 
on the Internet is to make the information more easily available and 
accessible, not to warn about any specific indi\ idual. Anyone who uses
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this information to injure, harass, or commit a criminal act against any 
person included in the registry or any other person is subject to criminal 
prosecution.^
(J.A. at 31.)
Although the record below provides no information about the crimes for which 
Respondent was convicted, his complaint in the trial court admits that he was convicted of a 
sexual offense that subjects him to the registration requirements of Connecticut’s Megan’s Law. 
(J.A. at 3.)
3. Otte V. Poe I.
In 1993, hearings held before the Alaska Legislature presented testimony that showed 
Alaska had a prevalent and growing problem of sexual abuse within its borders. (J.A. at 139-40 
nn. 4~9.) Information provided at the hearings established that Alaska had the highest child 
sexual abuse rate in the nation (six times the national average), the second highest sexual assault 
rale in the nation, and incidents of rape had jumped 91 percent over the previous two years. (J.A. 
at 139.) Lvidcncc produced at the hearings indicated that the high number of sexual offenders in 
Alaska would increase at twice the rate it had prior to 1993. (J.A. at 140.) Finally, studies 
presented to the Alaska Legislature evidenced sex offenders’ high recidivism rate. (J.A. at 140.) 
After receiving testimony and evidence, the Alaska Legislature found:
(1) sex offenders pose a high risk of re-offending after release from custody;
(2) protecting the public from sex offenders is a primary' governmental interest;
(3) the privacy interests of persons convicted of sex offenses are less important than the 
government’s interest in public safety; and
(4) release of certain information about sex offenders to public agencies and the general 
public will assist in protecting the public safety.
(J.A. at 140.)
This quote is taken from the district court opinion because the website is not publicly available 
at this time due to the court's permanent injunction issued May 17. 2001.
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Based on these findings, the Alaska Legislature enacted Alaska's version of Megan’s 
Law in 1993 for the purpose of protecting the public safety. (J.A. at 138, 140, 160.)
Alaska’s Megan’s Law contains both registration and notification provisions for sex 
offenders. (J.A. at 140.) To comply with the registration provisions the convicted sex offender 
must register in person at either the Alaska State Trooper post or municipal police department
located nearest to where the sex offender resides at the time of registration. (J.A. at 141.) The
registration provisions solicit basic information necessary to monitor the whereabouts of released 
sex offenders. (J.A. at 141.) If the sex offender has only one prior offense, the registration 
requirement ends fifteen years from the date of unconditional release. (J.A. at 141.) How'ever, if 
the sex offender has two or more convictions the registration requirement continues for life.
(J.A. at 141.)
The notification provisions of Alaska’s Megan’s Law provide hiw enforcement agencies 
and the public access to the sex offender’s name, date of birth, address, photograph, place of 
employment, and public information about the conviction, (J.A. at 141.) Additionally, the 
notification provisions charge the Department of Public Safety w'ith responsibility for 
maintaining a central registry of sex offenders. (J.A. at 141-42.) Consistent w'ith its duties to 
make Alaska communities safer and provide access to information regarding persons convicted 
of rape and child molestation, the Department of Public Safety made the Alaska Sex Offender 
Registry available over the Internet beginning in June 1997. (J.A. at 142.) The opening display 
of the Internet site contained the following warning: “This information is made available for the 
purpose of protecting the public. Anyone who uses this information to commit a criminal act 
against another person is subject to criminal prosecution.’* (J.A. at 142.)
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Both Doe I and Doe 11 were convicted for sexually abusing minors. (J.A. at 212-13.) In 
] 985, Doe I entered a plea of riolo contendere to a charge of sexual abuse of a minor and the 
Alaska Superior Court convicted Doe I for the routine sexual abuse of his daughter over a two- 
year period — from age 9 to age 11. (J.A. at 212.) In 1984, Doe II also entered a plea of nolo 
contendere to a charge of sexual abuse of a minor, and the Alaska Superior Court convicted Doe 
II for the sexual abuse of a minor - a 14-year-old child. (J.A. at 213.) As a result of their 
convictions for felonious sexual behavior. Doe 1 and Doe II are subject to the registration and 
notification requirements of Alaska’s Megan’s Law. (J.A. at 212.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I'he Connecticut and Alaska Megan’s Law statutes are constitutionally sound and should 
be upheld by this Court as necessary and appropriate responses to the very real concern shared 
b\' families across this nation about the dangers posed by sex offenders living in our midst. Both 
laws require convicted sex offenders - including rapists and child molesters - to provide 
information about their whereabouts so the state may disseminate it to law enforcement and 
parents may make informed decisions about how to prevent the sort of tragedy that occurred in 
New Jersey in 1994.
Scven-> car-old Megan Kanka’s rape and murder at the hands of a twice-convicted sex 
offender living down the street prompted a nationwide clarion call for sex offender registration 
and notification laws. In fact. Congress ordered states to adopt such laws, or else lose vital 
federal crime-fighting funds. Convicted sex offenders subject to the various state Megan’s Law 
statutes ha\'e challenged the laws on a variety of grounds. Their attacks have included lawsuits 
based on constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment, double jeopardy.
9
unreasonable search and seizure, ex post facto laws, and denial of equal protection and due 
process.
Respondent’s due process challenge in Connecticut Department of Public Safety v. Doe 
fails because he cannot satisfy the long-recognized stigma plus test developed by this Court in 
Paul V. Davis. 424 U.S. 693, 701-02 (1976). The State has not made a false, stigmatizing 
statement about Respondent, nor damaged his already-tarnished reputation. Additionally, 
Connecticut’s Megan’s Law does not implicate a constitutionally protected interest, as is 
required under the plus prong of the stigma plus test. Because Respondent meets neither the 
stigma nor the plus prong of the relevant test, his constitutional challenge based on the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment fails, and this Court should reverse the Second 
Circuit's ruling.
Similarly, Respondents in Otte v. Doe 1 fail to establish that Alaska’s Megan’s Law 
violates the U.S. Constitution’s prohibition on ex post facto laws because it fails the intent- 
effects test set forth in U.S. v. Ward. 448 U.S. 242, 248 (1980). The law was neither intended to 
be punitive, nor does it effectively punish registrants. Discussions in the Alaska Legislature 
emphasized that the law had a non-punitive purpose, namely protection of the public through the 
collection and dissemination of truthful information about convicted sex offenders. With the 
law’s intent clearly non-punitive, Respondents must show by the ‘‘clearest proof’ that its effect is 
to punish in order to make a valid claim. They fail to satisfy this high standard.
In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez. 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), this Court identified 
seven factors that must be weighed to determine whether a statute’s effect is punitive. 
Respondents and the State disagree primarily on three factors: whether Alaska's Megan's Law 
(1) imposes an affirmative disability or restraint on registrants, (2) promotes the traditional aims
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of punishment - deterrence and retribution, or (3) is excessive in relation to the non-punitive 
purpose assigned. A careful balancing of the Mendoza-Martinez factors weighs in favor of 
upholding Alaska’s Megan’s Law as an appropriate, non-punitive response to community 
concern about convicted sex offenders, who - as a class - are more likely to commit sexual 
offenses. This Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit’s ruling and find Alaska’s Megan’s Law 
constitutional on its face and as applied.
ARGUMENT
Respondents make two unpersuasive arguments as to why this Court should invalidate
Alaska and Connecticut’s Megan’s Law statutes. They claim that Connecticut’s statute violates
convicted sex offenders’ rights to due process, and that Alaska’s law violates the Constitution’s
hi\n on ex post facto laws. For the reasons slated below, the states of Connecticut and Alaska ask
Ibis Court to uphold both laws as necessary and appropriate responses to citizens’ concern about
con\'ictcd sex offenders. We ask this Court to reverse the Second Circuit and Ninth Circuit
decisions and permit state legislatures to provide accurate, truthful information to their citizens
so that they may make informed decisions about their safety and their children’s safety.
I. CONNECTICUT’S MEGAN'S LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE CONVICTED SEX
OFFENDERS’ RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BECAUSE IT DOES NOT SATISFY THE 
STIGMA PLUS TEST.
The Second Circuit erred when it invalidated Connecticut’s Megan’s Law. Although the 
I ].S. Constitution prohibits a state from depriving a person of life, liberty or property without due 
process of law, the Fourteenth Amendment is limited. Paul. 424 U.S. at 700. It only ser\'es to 
bar state action that is done “under color of law” and which deprives a person “of some right 
secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.” M, A plaintiff claiming a due process 
violation under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 must show: (1) the state made a stigmatizing statement
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about him that is sufficiently derogatory to injure his reputation and (2) the state has imposed a 
tangible and material burden that alters his status or implicates a protected right (‘‘stigma plus 
tesf'). Paul. 424 U.S. at 701-02. Furthermore, the plaintiff must show that the state’s 
stigmatizing statement caused the alteration in legal status or infringed the protected interest, fth 
at711.
A. Respondent’s Claim Fails the Stigma Prong of the Stigma Plus Test because the 
State Has Not Made a False Statement that Injured His Reputatiom
1. Inclusion on the website does not satisfy the stigma prong because the 
statement is true.
If the Court finds that Connecticut’s Megan’s Law violates the Due Process Clause, the 
mandated remedy is “an opportunity to refute the charge.” See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 
627 (1977). To satisfy the stigma prong of the stigma plus test. Respondent must show that the 
reputation-tarnishing statement about him is “substantially false. S_e_e i^ (noting that a name- 
clearing hearing is only useful if there is a factual dispute over the statement that injured 
plaintiffs reputation). Plaintiff is unable to show the government made a false statement, 
therefore he is unable to satisfy the stigma prong. See id.
The respondent in Codd argued that the New York City Police Department denied him 
due process when it fired him and placed a stigmatizing report in his personnel file without 
affording him a hearing. Id. at 624-25. He alleged that the report about his apparent suicide 
attempt resulted in his dismissal from a subsequent job. Id at 625. He did not, however, dispute 
the accuracy of the report. Id. at 627. The Court found that a hearing would serve no useful 
purpose because there was no factual dispute. Id. at 628. The Court gave little weight to the fact 
that the subsequent employer, Penn-Central Railroad Police Department, interred that 
Respondent was fired because of the suicide attempt. Id at 626. 628.
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Like the respondent in Codd> Respondent here does not assert that the information 
contained in the website registry was false. He does not challenge the statement that he was 
convicted of a qualifying sex offense. In fact, he admits as much in his complaint filed with the 
district court. (J.A. at 3.) Therefore, this Court should acknowledge that there is no factual 
dispute about the accuracy of the information contained in the Connecticut website registry, and 
deny Respondent’s request for a hearing as it did in Codd. See 429 U.S. at 628.
In sum, Respondent fails to satisfy the stigma prong because the State has disseminated 
only truthful information about him. Any notion that the State should prohibit the dissemination 
of truthful information is contradicted by this Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.
St. Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976) (criticizing as 
liighly paternalistic a state law that seeks to protect consumers by prohibiting truthful 
advertising).
2. Website visitors’ assumptions that Respondent is currently dangerous do 
not constitute a stigmatizing statement by the State.
Instead of asserting an inaccuracy in the infonnation. Respondent’s anemic argument 
rests on the possihilUy that some people who read the website registry may infer that Respondent 
is currently dangerous. His argument fails for lack of support. This Court has never held that 
statements, wliich others infer to be defamatory, constitute a stigma for purposes of the Due 
ITocess Clause. In fact, this Court has indicated that the opposite is true: assumptions made by 
people who receive the information in question are not enough to constitute a reputation­
damaging statement. Bd. of Regents of St. Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573-75 (1972).
In Roth, a non-lenured teacher claimed he was denied due process when the state 
university declined to rchire him after his one-year temi ended and failed to provide a hearing or 
cNplain the non-retention decision. 408 U.S. at 567-68. This Court noted that it was not enough
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that the lower courts assumed that non-retention would stigmatize the teacher and affect his 
future job prospects. Roth, 408 U.S. at 574 n. 13. The Court found that non-retention did not 
impose ‘^a stigma or other disability that foreclosed his freedom to take advantage of other 
employment opportunities.” Id at 573. “The state, in declining to rehire the [teacher], did not 
make any charge against him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his 
community.” Id.
Respondent’s argument in the present case is similarly illogical. He claims that the 
State’s act of offering a website with accurate information that is otherwise publicly available 
constitutes a false statement simply because a website visitor may assume Respondent is 
dangerous based on the information contained there. (J.A. at 17-19.) Respondent cites the 
newspaper libel case of Milkovich v. Lorain J. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17-20 (1990), for the proposition 
that defamatory comments need not be explicit to create a cause of action. In that case, a 
newspaper columnist accused a high school wrestling coach and school superintendent of perjurv' 
- a crime for which they were neither arrested nor convicted. Id at 4. The column described a 
braw'l that broke out at a wrestling meet and the subsequent investigative hearing before the high 
school athletic association. Id at 5. The column stated: “Anyone who attended the meet. . . 
knows in his heart that Milkovich and Scott lied at the hearing after each having gi\ en his 
solemn oath to tell the truth.” Id The Court held that a reasonable fact finder could conclude 
that the newspaper had defamed the men by accusing them of perjury. Id. at 21.
Even if this Court were to expand its Due Process jurisprudence by adopting the 
Milkovich rule that defamation need not be explicit, Connecticut's Megan’s Law is 
distinguishable on tw'o key issues. First, the State did its utmost to dispel the notion that it had 
made a determination as to registrants' propensity to re-offend. The website (when it was active)
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conlained an explicit message to viewers that the State had made no assessment about the 
registrants' current dangerousness.^ Comparatively, the newspaper columnist in Milkovich did 
his utmost to convince readers that the wrestling coach and school superintendent had lied under 
oalh.*^ Second, the subjects of the statements are exact opposites. In the present case, the State is 
informing the public through its website that registrants have been convicted of certain sex 
offenses and crimes against children. (J.A. at 31.) In Milkovich. the newspaper accused two 
men of committing crimes for which they were never even arrested. 497 U.S. at 4.
If the Court intends to expand the stigma analysis in due process cases to recognize as 
stigmatizing statements that are factually accurate but are capable of being perceived as false and 
ilefamatory. a more appropriate test is that articulated in White v. Fraternal Order of Police, 909 
1 .2d 512. 520 (D.C. Cir 1990). The test provides that a statement is not defamatory if, viewed in 
its entire context, it merely con\'eys materially true facts from which a defamatory' inference can 
reasonably be drawn. If the context or language of the statement supplies additional, affirmative 
e\ idence suggesting that the speaker intends or endorses the defamatory inference, the statement 
will be deemed to carry that meaning (''White test"). White. 909 F.2d at 520.
fhe White test is relevant for the present case and other Megan’s Law cases because it 
takes into account the context in which the statement was made. In Connecticut's case, the State
' The first page of the Internet registry states: “The Department of Public Safety has not 
considered or assessed the specific risk of reoffense [sic] with regard to any individual prior to 
liis or her inclusion within this registry, and has made no determination that any individual 
included in the registry is currently dangerous. Individuals included within the registry are 
included solely by virtue of their conviction record and state law.” (J.A. at 31.)
‘ file headline of the column read; “Maple [Heights High School] beat the law with the ‘big 
lie.'" and the headline on the carryover page read: “[Columnist] says Maple told a lie."
Milkox ich. 497 U.S. at 4. The column itself included the following statement: “If you're 
successful enough, and powerful enough, and can sound sincere enough, you stand an excellent 
chance of making the lie stand up, regardless of what really happened." Id at 5.
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makes clear it is not implying that registrants are currently dangerous. (J.A. at 31.) The 
disclaimer eliminates the possibility that website visitors will infer that the State has determined 
whether Respondent and the other registrants are likely to re-offend. Members of the public may 
make up their own minds about the convicted sex offenders’ current dangerousness. Under the 
White test, Connecticut’s Megan’s Law would not satisfy the stigma prong of the stigma plus 
test because the website registry simply provides materially true facts from which a defamatory 
inference may be drawn. See 909 F.2d at 520.
In conclusion, this Court has noted that implications are not enough in the context of a 
due process claim; the proper standard is an explicit, false statement. See Roth, 408 U.S. at 573 
('‘there is no suggestion that the state, in declining to re-employ the respondent, imposed on him 
a stigma or other disability”). If the Court intends to expand its Due Process jurisprudence to 
recognize defamation by implication, however, the White test provides the most appropriate 
standard forjudging whether Megan’s Law registries constitute a stigma. See 909 F.2d at 520.
3. Any damage to Respondent’s reputation results from his conviction for a 
sex offense rather than inclusion on the website.
In addition to the website registry information being true. Respondent cannot show that 
the “slatcmcnf’ about him was sufficiently derogatory to damage his reputation as is required 
under the stigma plus test. Paul. 424 U.S. at 701-02. When the state defames a person with a 
derogatory label sufficient to damage his “good name, reputation, honor, or integrity,” it can 
constitute a stigma under the stigma plus test. Id at 708-09 (citing Wis. v. Constantineau, 400 
U.S. 433,437 (1971)). The Court made clear, however, that a due process claim will not lie 
against the state for publicizing an official act such as an arrest. See Paul, 424 U.S. at 713. 
(noting that plaintiff could not claim constitutional protection against the disclosure of the fact of 
his arrest on a shoplifting charge).
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As an example of reputation-damaging stigma, this Court found defamatory a Wisconsin
law that permitted police to post a notice in liquor stores forbidding the sale of alcohol to an 
individual, which effectively labeled her a drunk. Constantineau. 400 U.S. at 436. The posting 
could be based solely on the written request of a spouse or city leaders; the statute did not require 
that the individual be convicted - or even arrested - for any alcohol-related crime, such as drunk 
driving or public intoxication. Id at 434. The Court found that the woman who was named on a 
posted notice should have been given an opportunity to defend herself because she “may have 
been the victim of an official's caprice.'" id at 437.
Comparatively, Connecticut's Megan's Law only provides for the listing of individuals 
who ha\'e been convicted of specified sexual offenses or crimes against children, such as 
kidnapping. Conn. Gen. Stal. §§ 54-251, 54-252, 54-254. The concern expressed by the 
Constantineau Court - that a named indi\'idual might be the victim of an official’s caprice - is 
simpl) not present here. Furthennore, any stigma that Respondent may suffer as a result of 
being listed (^n the w ebsite registr>' flow s from the fact that he w'as convicted of a qualifying 
offense, a crime which he chose to commit and for w'hich he w'as afforded due process 
protections.^ So. any notion that Respondent's reputation was tarnished simply because he was 
included on the sex offender registry is ridiculous.
Respondent damaged his own reputation when he decided to commit the sex crime for 
which he was convicted. The fact that law enforcement and members of the community are able 
to \'isit a website and obtain information about Respondent’s past crimes bears little distinction 
from the fact that anyone can comb through courthouse records and discover the information on
Respondent does not assert that he was denied due process when he was charged and convicted 
of his qualif\ ing sexual offense.
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their own, or that newspapers are entitled to publish articles about Respondent’s arrest and 
conviction. See Time. Inc, v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (noting that “[e]xposure of the self 
to others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized community. The risk of this 
exposure is an essential incident of life in a society, which places a primary value on freedom of 
speech and of press).
In sum, the State has not stigmatized Respondent by including him on the website 
because the statement was true (i.e., he is a sex offender). Cf Codd. 429 U.S. at 627 (holding 
that plaintiff must show the reputation-tarnishing statement about him is false). Furthermore, 
inclusion on the website was not the cause of any damage done to his reputation. See c.g. Doe 
V. Kcllcv. 961 F. Supp. 1105, 1110 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (noting that notification provisions 
themselves do not touch the offender at all). Therefore. Respondent has not met the first prong 
of the stigma plus test, and his claim of a due process violation fails. I his Court should reverse 
the Second Circuit’s ruling.
B. Respondent’s Claim Fails the Plus Front! because the Retzistration and
Notification Provisions of Connecticut's Meuan’s Taw Do Not Implicate a
Protected Interest.
Government action that impacts reputation alone, without a more tangible interest such as 
employment, is not sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Due Process Clause. 
Paul. 424 U.S. at 701. Under the second prong of the stigma plus test. Respondent must show 
that the State imposed a tangible and material burden that alters his status or implicates a 
protected right. See id. at 701-02.
1. Connecticut’s Megan’s Law docs not deprive Respondent of a liberty 
interest because it does not alter his legal status.
Fven if the Court assumes that inclusion on the website did harm Respondent's 
repulation. mere defamation by a public official does not deprive an individual of a protected
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interest within the meaning of the Due Process Clause. Paul. 424 U.S. at 702. To establish a 
protected liberty interest, a plaintiff must show that the state action deprived him of aright 
prc\ iously held under state law. at 708. Liberty interests include: freedom from bodily 
restraint, the right of an individual to contract, engage in “any of the common occupations of 
life." acquire useful knowledge, marry, establish a home, raise children, worship God according 
to the dictates of one’s own conscience, and generally “enjoy those privileges long recognized ..
. as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.” Roth, 408 U.S. at 572.
Respondent seizes on broad language contained in Paul that guarantees procedural 
protections of the Fourteenth Amendment whenever the state seeks to remove or significantly 
alter an individual’s protected legal status. 424 U.S. at 711-12. Respondent makes the 
Linsubstanliated argument that the registration requirements contained in Connecticut's Megan’s 
Law and the penalties for non-compliance significantly alter his legal status, thereby depriving 
him of a protected liberty interest.
First, there is no Connecticut law that guarantees a resident the right to be free from 
paperw ork on an annual basis. In fact, the opposite is true. All residents are required to file their 
state taxes annually, drivers must pay their automobile registration fees every year, and motorists 
are required to update their dri\'cr's license infomiation and car registration whene^'er they move. 
See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-17a, 14-45 (2001).
Second, the mere fact that Respondent must update his registry information annually or 
e\ cry 90 days does not restrict his right to move about the state - or even leave the state if he 
wishes. In fact, Connecticut’s Megan's Law specifically permits a registrant to travel or move to 
another slate without seeking the State's approval. See Conn. Gen. Slat. §§ 54-251, 54-252, 54- 
254. Cf Weems v. U.S.. 217 U.S. 349. 380-81 (1910) (invalidating a statute on the basis of
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cruel and unusual punishment because petitioner not only had to register with the authorities, but 
could not relocate unless he obtained written permission).
Third, the fact that registration is triggered by conviction for a sex offense is not 
sufficient to alter Respondent’s legal status. This Court has upheld a state law that revoked the 
medical license of a doctor convicted of a felony even though it infringed on his right to practice 
his chosen profession. Hawker v. N.Y.. 170U.S. 189, 196(1898). Federal appellate courts 
across the country have upheld 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(9), a federal statute that prohibits 
individuals convicted of a misdemeanor domestic violence offense from owning firearms. E.g. 
IJ.S. v. Denis. 297 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 2002) (noting that it is immaterial in terms of 
constitutionality that the firearm prohibition statute is triggered by a prior conviction for 
domestic violence); U.S. v. Mitchell. 209 F.3d 319, 322-23 (4lh Cir. 2000) (concluding that 
appellant's “conduct in assaulting his wife - the act that led to his misdemeanor domestic 
violence conviction - put [him] on sufficient notice" that he would be subject to a law 
prohibiting firearm possession), cert, denied. 531 U.S. 849 (2000). Like the medical license at 
issue in Hawker or the right to possess a firearm involved in the section 922(g)(9) cases, the fact 
that the registration requirements under Connecticut's Megan's Law are triggered by a prior 
conviction for a sexual offense should not render it unconstitutional.
There simply is no support for Respondent’s contention that the imposition of filling out 
burdensome paperwork on a regular basis constitutes a change in his legal status. See e.g. Conn. 
Gen. Stat. §§ 14-17a, 14-45. Additionally, Connecticut's Megan’s Law imposes no restriction 
on Respondent’s right to travel and live where he pleases. See Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 54-251, 54- 
252. 54-254. Finally, the fact that registration requirements are triggered by Respondent's prior 
conviction for a sex offense poses no constitutional hurdle. See 1 lawker. 1 70 U.S. at 196.
Thercrore, Respondent fails to satisfy the plus prong of the stigma plus test with his claims of 
deprivation of a liberty interest.
2. Respondent is not deprived of a property interest because no slate law 
guarantees him a right to his reputation.
Respondent's claim that he was a deprived of a property interest is similarly flawed. 
Properly interests take many forms, but due process safeguards are intended to protect only 
"interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits.’* Roth. 408 U.S. at 576. To 
ha\ e a properly interest in a benefit, a person must have “a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.” 
IT at 577. Property interests are not created by the Constitution, but are rather a product of an 
independent source, such as a state law. Id.
Research has disclosed no Connecticut law that guarantees Respondent and other 
eoin ieted se.x offenders a specific property interest in their reputations. Cf Goldberg v. Kelly, 
."97 U.S. 254. 257 n. 1 (1970). in which a state law guaranteed welfare benefits to eligible 
applicants. Similarly, the courts have found property interests in jobs that were tenninated 
despite tenure or contract pro\'isions. Sec Slochowcr v. Bd. of Educ.. 350 U.S. 551,559 (1956) 
(holding that a public college professor dismissed from an office held under tenure provisions 
has a continued interest in employment that is protected by due process): see also Wiemanv.,
I ’pdeuraff. 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952) (holding that college professors and staff members 
dismissed during the terms of their contracts were denied due process). Respondent’s claimed 
interest in his reputation is vastly different from the welfare benefits, tenured professorships and 
contract employment that this Court previously considered. As the Roth Court noted. 
Respondent "surely had an abstract concern" in his reputation, but he did not have a properly 
interest as delhied under the Court's due process jurisprudence. See 408 U.S. at 578.
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Respondent’s reliance on Constantineau is misplaced. (J.A. at 89.) There, the Court 
invalidated a state law that permitted police to post signs in retail liquor outlets that forbid the 
sale of liquor to named individuals who, after excessive drinking, expose themselves or family 
“to want*' or who become dangerous. Constantineau. 400 U.S. at 434. The Court held that the 
Wisconsin “posting*’ law deprived the individual of a right previously held under state law: the 
right to purchase alcohol. Id Comparatively, even without the website offered under 
Connecticut’s Megan's Law, individuals arc free to comb public courtliouse records and obtain 
the same information about Respondent. U.S. Dent, of J. v. Rptrs. Comm, for Freedom of the 
Press. 489 U.S. 749, 753 (1989).
For the foregoing reasons. Respondent fails to substantiate his claim that Connecticut’s 
Megan’s Law deprives him of a property interest. I herefore. he fails to satisfy the plus prong of 
the stigma plus test, and his claim of a due process deprivation falls Hat. 'fhis Court should 
reverse the Second Circuit’s decision, and uphold Connecticut's Megan's Law.
C. Respondent’s Claim Fails the Stiuma l^lus 1'est because the Link between the
Stiema and the Plus Elements Is too Attenuated.
Even if this Court were to find that the stigma and plus elements are satisfied. 
Respondent’s claim fails because the plus factor (i.e.. the allegedly status-altering registration 
requirements) does not flow from the stigmatizing statement (i.e.. dissemination via the website). 
Sec Paul. 424 U.S. at 7II (noting that plaintiff was required to show that “as a result of the state 
action complained of, a right or status previously recognized by state law was altered or 
extinguished”).
As an example of appropriately linked stigma and plus factors, the Wisconsin statute in 
Constantineau deprived plaintiff of her right to purchase alcohol because the defamatory flyer 
posted in liquor stores prohibited retailers from selling to her. 400 I fS. at 435. Additionally, the
0?
(.'curt found a sufficient link between the stigma and the plus factors when a school damaged 
students' reputations by suspending them for wrongdoing without an opportunity to clear their 
names, which deprived them of their right to a public school education. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 
565, 575-75 (1975). Here, however, the stigma and plus elements are reversed. Any damage 
that may be done to Respondent's reputation occurs only because the State has registered him as 
a sex offender and disseminated information about him to the public.
The attenuated nature of the registration and notification provisions is further highlighted 
In the fact that the remedy Respondent seeks - an opportunity to prove he is not currently 
dangerous - only addresses the stigma element of the stigma plus test. (J.A. at 19.) In fact, the 
permanent injunction issued by the district court and affirmed by the Second Circuit only 
prevents the State from disseminating the registry information to the public. (J.A. at 56.) The 
iniunclion does not order the Connecticut Department of Public Safety to discontinue registering 
convicted sex offenders, nor does it indicate that registrants may ignore their obligation to update 
information annually or every ninety days as required under Connecticut General Statutes section 
54-257{c).
failure to satisfy the stigma and plus prongs of the stigma plus test and failure to show a 
causal link between the two prongs renders Respondent's due process claim invalid. This Court 
should reverse the Second Circuit's ruling and uphold Connecticut's Megan's Law.
11. ALASKA'S MEGAN'S LAW DOES NOT VIOLATE THE EX POST FACTO
CI.AUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION BECAUSE IT IS NOT PUNITIVE UNDER
THE INTENT-EFFECTS TEST.
1'he Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. Constitution prohibits states from enacting laws 
liiat alter the punishment and inflict a greater penalty than what the law originally assigned to the 
crime when it was committed. U.S. Const, art. 1. § 10: Calder v. Bull. 3 U.S. 386. 591 (1798). A
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retroactive statute is subject to the constraints of the Ex Post Facto Clause when the statute
“increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable.” Cal. Dept, of Corrections v. Morales.
514 U.S. 499, 506 n. 3 (1995). Therefore, the key to whether a statute is an ex post facto law is 
whether it is punitive. Russell v. Gregoire. 124 F.3d 1079, 1083 (9th Cir. 1997), cert, denied.,
523 U.S. 1007(1998).
Whether a statute is classified as punitive requires a two-part inquiry known as the 
“intent-effects” test. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248. Under the “intent-effects” test, a law violates the 
Ex Post Facto Clause if: “(1) The legislature intended the sanction to be punitive; and (2) the 
sanction is ‘so punitive’ in effect as to prevent the court from legitimately viewing it as 
regulatory or civil in nature, despite the legislature's intent.” Russell. 124 F.3d at 1086-87.
In the case at hand, Respondents allege that Alaska's Megan's Law is an ex post facto 
law' because it increases the penalty by which a crime is puni.shable. (J.A. at 143-68.) Under the 
“intent-effects” test, however, the Alaska Legislature's intent is non-punitive and the effects of 
the statute are reasonable in relation to legislative purpose. Therefore. Alaska's Megan's Law 
does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause.
A. The Alaska Legislature Did Not Intend Alaska’s Meuan's Law' to Be Punitive
because It Was Enacted to Promote Public Safety.
The first part of the “intent-effects” test looks to the declared purpose of the legislature as 
well as the structure and design of the statute. U.S. v. Urserv. 518 U.S. 267, 288 (1996). 
Beginning in 1993, the Alaska Legislature conducted hearings regarding the grow ing crisis of 
sexual offenders and sex crimes within the state. (J.A. at 139.) After considering statistical, 
historical, and anecdotal evidence the Alaska Legislature found that “recidivism of sex offenders 
is a problem and that the registration of sex offenders and the release of certain information 
about them will protect the public." Patterson v. Alaska. 985 P.2d 1007. 1011 (Alaska App.
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1999) (finding the Alaska Legislature's purpose for enacting Alaska's Megan’s Law was to 
protect the public); (J.A. at 140.)
The purpose of the Alaska Legislature in enacting Alaska’s Megan’s Law was to promote 
the public welfare, which it deemed was a “valid regulatory goal.’* Patterson. 985 P.2d at 1011. 
Additionally, the U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska, and the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals agreed that the Alaska Legislature intended Alaska’s Megan’s Law to be a “measure 
designed to accomplish a non-punitive purpose.” OUe, 259 F.3d at 986; (J.A. at 154, 160.)
These legislati% e findings demonstrate a clear, non-punitive intent on behalf of the Alaska 
Legislature. See e.g. Urserv. 518 U.S. at 288.
Consistent with this non-punitive purpose, the structure and design of Alaska's Megan's 
Law points to the civil aims of the Alaska Legislature, just as other valid sex offender 
registration and notification statutes have. Russell. 124 F.3d at 1082 (upholding Washington's 
Megan's Law, which requires sex offenders to register so the state can compile and disseminate 
information to the public). Similar to Washington's Megan's Law', Alaska's Megan’s Law 
requires convicted sex offenders to provide basic personal information that is then disseminated 
to the public through notification provisions. M.; Alaska Stat. §§ 12.63.010-12.63.100. 
'Therefore, this same statutory structure and design found in other Megan’s Law statutes is not 
incon.sistent with the Alaska Legislature’s non-punitive intent. Russell. 124 F.3d at 1082.
Furthermore, the placement of a statute in the criminal code instead of the civil code does 
not indicate that the legislature had a punitive intent. Patterson. 985 P.2d at 1012; see generally 
Russell. 124 F.3d at 1079. Indeed, various chapters of Alaska's Criminal Code address many 
areas of the law including bail, victims' rights, and post trial matters. Patterson. 985 P.2d at
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1012. Alaska’s Megan’s Law is placed in the Alaska Criminal Code only because it is “a by­
product of a sex offender’s conviction.” Patterson. 985 P.2d at 1012.
Therefore, regardless of the codification of Alaska's Megan's Law in the Alaska 
Criminal Code, the Alaska Legislature’s non-punitive intent was sufficient to establish a civil 
remedy in an effort to deal with the immediate problem of sex offender recidivism and 
increasing sex crimes within the State of Alaska. See Femedecr v. llaun. 227 F.3d 1244, 1249 
(10th Cir. 2000) (noting that the clear purpose of Utah’s sex offender registration and 
notification system (“Utah’s Megan’s Law”) established a non-punitive intent under the intent- 
effects test); (J.A. at 140.)
B. The Registration and Notification Provisions of Alaska’s Megan’s Law Do Not
Have a Punitive Lffect because 1'hcv Are Appropriate in l.iuht of the Leaislative 
Purpose.
The second part of the “intent-effects” test requires the challenging party to demonstrate 
by “the clearest proof’ that the statutory scheme is “so punitive" in effect that it negates the 
stale’s non-punitive intent. Kan, v. Hendricks. 512 U.S. 346. 361 (1997). This Court has noted 
that the seven factors mentioned in Mendoza-Martinez. 372 U.S. at 168-69. while neither 
cxhausti\'e nor dispositive, have been helpful in “detemiining whether a purportedly civil 
sanction has been transformed into a criminal or punitive one.” Sec Ward, 448 U.S. at 249 
(holding that civil penalties for polluting navigable waterways were not punitive but regulator\')-
The seven Mendoza-Martinez factors are:
(1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint,
(2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment,
(3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
(4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment - retribution
and deterrence,
(5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime.
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(6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable
for it, and
(7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. 
Mendoza-Martinez. 372 U.S. at 168-69.
In analyzing statutes under these seven factors, there is no aggregate number of factors 
that together automatically tip the scales tow'ard the “so punitive standard. Hudson v. U.S., 522 
I I.S. 93. 101 (1997). Rather, the factors arc to be applied as a balancing test. M. However, of 
the seven factors, three are substantial in the present case: (1) whether the sanction involves an 
affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of 
punishment - retribution and deterrence; and (3) whether it appears excessive in relation to the 
alternative purpose assigned. Mendoza-Martinez. 372 U.S. at 168-69; Otte. 259 F.ad at 987-9,>. 
(J.A. at 216-21.); see Ward. 448 U.S. at 249-50 (analyzing a civil penalty for polluting 
wiiterw'ays by considering only the fifth Mendoza-Martine_z factor).
1. Alaska's Megan's Law imposes no affirmative disability or restraint
because it neither approaches the infamous punishment of imprisonment, 
nor regulates convicted sex offenders' behavior.
An affinnative disability or restraint is detemiined by whether a sanction approaches the 
"inlamous punishment of imprisonment.” Cutshall v. Sundquist. 193 F.3d 466, 474 (6th Cir. 
1999). cert, denied. 529 U.S. 1053 (2000). In Cutshall. after comparing the minimal burdens 
imposed by the Tennessee Sex Offender Registration and Monitoring Act (“Tennessee's 
Megan's Law”) to burdens imposed by other statutes that did not impose affirmative disability or 
restraint on their subjects, the Sixth Circuit held that the statute’s registration and notification 
provisions imposed no restraint whatever upon the activities of a registrant. UL at 474-75. 
l ennessee's Megan's Law' required the registrant to notify the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation 
of domicile, place of employment, and other basic data. Id.
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Here, Alaska’s Megan’s Law requirements, similar to I ennessee's Megan's Law, are less
onerous than restrictions on employment, termination of vested social security benefits, and 
deportation. Cutshall. 193 F.3d at 474-75: see also Hudson. 522 U.S. at 104 (disbarment from 
banking industry for misapplication of bank funds); Flemmine v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 612-21 
(1960) (termination of vested social security benefits for persons deported for engaging in 
communist activities); Galvan v. Press. 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (deportation for prior 
membership in Communist Party). The only marked difference between I ennessee’s Megan’s 
Law and Alaska’s Megan’s Law is that in Alaska, registrants must register in person. Cutshall. 
193 F.3d at 469-71;^ Alaska Stat. § 12.63.020(a)-(b).
Although Alaska’s requirement that individuals register in person may be involuntary^ and 
inconvenient, it does not approach the magnitude of imprisonment. In-person registration 
requirements do not prohibit where the sex offender may li\c. nor do they mandate that he or she 
must request approval. Cf. Weems. 217 U.S. at 380-81 (invalidating a statute on the grounds 
that it was cruel and unusual punishment because Weems not only had to register with the 
authorities, but could not relocate unless he obtained written permission). Indeed, registered sex 
offenders in the state of Alaska are free to come and go, even leave the stale, it they so choose. 
Alaska Stat. § 12.63.030. The registration provisions require only that the convicted sex 
offender notify the proper authorities within two weeks of a move. Id^
Similar to imprisonment, the Ninth Circuit analogized Alaska's Megan’s Law to 
probation or supervised release. Otte, 259 F.3d at 987; (J.A. at 216.) However, unlike probation 
or super\’ised release, Alaska’s Megan’s Law imposes no restrictions on registrants’ bcha\ ior. 
Patterson. 985 P.2d at 1012. Alaska's Megan's Law^ only defines a sex offender's duly to 
register and imposes sanctions for failure to comply with the statute. Id
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Additionally, inquiry into the effects of Alaska's Megan's Law cannot consider the 
possible illegal responses of citizens to notification. Russell. 124 F.3d at 1092 (noting that all 
“possible community responses" to the law were not so onerous as to preclude the court from 
llnding the act regulatory or remedial). In considering a statute’s potential punitive effects 
"courts must presume that law enforcement will [enforce] the law and will protect offenders 
from vigilantism." Id. In the present case, the same rationale applies to the anticipation or 
contemplation of any responses by the citizens of Alaska against registered sex offenders. See 
id.
Furthermore, it is important to note that retaliatory behavior is not a result of community 
reaction to receiving already public information. Doe v. Pataki. 120 F.3d 1263. 1280 {2d Cir.
1997). cert, denied. 522 U.S. 1122 (1998). Rather, it is the initial sex offense and commission of 
the crime that motivates such acts, not Alaska’s Megan s Law itself. See id. Additionally, the 
website clearly stated that the information provided was not to be used for purposes of 
harassment or criminal conduct and that crimes against registrants would be prosecuted. (J.A. at 
142.) As a result, possible illegal responses by Alaska citizens cannot be considered in analyzing 
the effects of Alaska's Megan’s Law. See Russell, 124 F.3d at 1092.
Therefore, Alaska's Megan's Law provisions are not similar to imprisonment, super\'ised 
release, or parole because they do not supervise or restrict sex offenders’ behavior. See e.g. 
Cutshall. 193 F.3d at 474; Patterson. 985 P.2d at 1012. Therefore, this factor weighs against 
llnding Alaska’s Megan’s Law has a punitive effect.
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2, The traditional aims of punishment - deterrence and retribution - are not 
furthered because a deterrent effect is not dispositive and Alaska’s 
Megan’s Law affixes no culpability for prior criminal conduct.
A sanction’s deterrent effect does not necessarily mean that it must be classified as 
criminal. Femedeer. 227 F.3d at 1252 (citing Urserv, 518 U.S. at 292 (holding that the interest 
of deterrence may be expressed in civil statutes as well as criminal statutes to effectuate societal 
goals)). Having already concluded that Utah’s Megan’s Law had “civil purposes and effects of 
deterrence, avoidance and investigation,” the court in Femedeer held that this factor “cut both 
ways.” 227 F.3d at 1252. The fact that the statute attached additional negative consequences to 
sex offenses did not alone render it criminal punishment. Id.
The standard used to analyze a statute's deterrent effect, established in Ursery, and 
reinforced by Femedeer can be applied to the present case. jd. Wliile Alaska s Megan s Law- 
may deter registered sex offenders from committing further crimes, the additional negative 
consequences to sex offenders do not alone render Alaska's Megan's Law punitive. Id Most 
sex offenders will undoubtedly prefer to not comply with the statute. How'ever, the perspective 
of the criminals does not determine whether a statute is punitive. Seg Mont, v. Kurth Ranch, 511 
U.S. 767, 111 n. 14 (1994) (noting that “whether a sanction constitutes punishment is not 
dctemiined from the defendant’s perspective as even remedial sanctions carry the ‘sting of 
punishment’”). The fact that Alaska’s Megan’s Law has been established for the civil purposes 
of protecting the public and facilitating the flow of important information to law enforcement 
and citizens of Alaska overrides sex offenders’ preferences. See id.
A statute is retributive if it affixes culpability for prior criminal conduct. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. at 362 (explaining that an involuntary commitment statute for sexually violent predators 
was not retributive because it did not attach culpability for prior criminal conduct, but used that
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prior conduct solely for “evidentiary purposes” in applying the statute). Here, Alaska's Megan s 
Law does not affix culpability. See Alaska Stat. §§ 12.63.010-12.63.100. Rather, the sex 
offender’s conviction serves an evidentiary purpose as a triggering mechanism for application of 
a statute that monitors the general whereabouts of convicted sex offenders. Hendricks. 521 U.S. 
at 362. Therefore, with respect to the traditional aims of punishment, retribution is not present in 
Alaska's Megan’s Law. See id.
Additionally, any retribution in Alaska’s Megan’s Law must be found on the face of the 
statute or in its design. Mendoza-Martinez. 372 U.S. at 169. As noted above, the Alaska 
Legislature enacted Alaska’s Megan’s Law for non-punitive purposes. ^ discussion supra at 
24. Nowhere in Alaska’s Megan’s Law does the statute mention retribution or enact 
requirements consistent with retribution as it is understood in the traditional sense - affixing 
culpability for prior criminal conduct. Hendricks. 521 U.S. at 362.
Because the intent of the Alaska Legislature was non-punitive, any extension of the 
traditional aims of punishment is furthered only where civil and criminal non-punitive intent 
coincide. As a result, this factor is inconclusive in determining whether the effect of Alaska’s 
Megan’s Law is punitive. ^ Femedeer. 227 F.3d at 1252 (determining that this factor “cut 
both ways” gi\ cn the “mixed effects” of a statute that has civil purposes with deterrent effects).
3. Alaska’s Megan’s Law is not excessive in relation to the non-punitive 
purpose assigned - public safety.
The third Mendoza-Martinez factor weighs whether the statute appears excessive in 
relation to the alternative purpose assigned - in this case, public safety. 372 U.S. at 169. In 
analyzing this factor, excessiveness alone may not be raised to dispositive status. Femedeer. 
227 F.3d at 1249. Additionally, this Court has specifically disapproved of overemphasis on 
ONcessi\'encss. Hudson. 522 U.S. at 118.
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In reaching the decision that Alaska’s Megan’s Law was excessive, the Ninth Circuit 
relied heavily on (1) the statute’s lack of a risk-assessment mechanism, and (2) the broad nature 
of the Internet used to execute the notification provisions. Otte. 259 F.3d at 991-93; (J.A. at 219- 
21.) Given that the absence of a risk-assessment mechanism is not fatal to a statute and that the 
Internet is a passive medium that increases efficiency and usefulness of already public 
information, Alaska’s Megan’s Law is not excessive in relation to the non-punitive purpose of 
assisting communities to protect themselves from sex crimes.
First, it is not necessary that Alaska’s Megan’s Law incorporate a risk-assessment 
mechanism into its registration and notification. Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1253. In Femedeer, the 
Tenth Circuit upheld Utah’s Megan’s Law, which had no risk assessment mechanism. Id at 
1248-53. While noting that other states had chosen to incorporate defined risk-assessment 
mechanisms into their statutes, the court explained that a statute is not necessarily excessive for 
purposes of this Mendoza-Martinez factor simply because the stale has not achieved a fit 
between ends and means. Id at 1253.
In the present case, Alaska’s Megan’s Law, similar to Utah's Megan’s Law, has not 
incorporated a risk-assessment mechanism into its registration or notilication provisions. (J.A. at 
140-42.) However, by disclosing the crime for which a registrant was convicted through the 
notification provisions, Alaska’s Megan’s Law allows members of the public to assess the risk of 
the offenders themselves. By allowing law enforcement and citizens to gauge the risk a 
convicted sex offender poses to the community, both are empowered to protect themselves and 
their families according to the risk they perceive. Just because the Alaska Legislature has not 
achieved a perfect fit between the ends and means of Alaska's Megan's Law, does not
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necessarily mean that it is excessive in relation to the legislative purpose of registering convicted 
sex offenders to assist law enforcement and protect the public. See Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1253.
Second, the execution of notification provisions through the Internet is not excessive in 
relation to the purposes of sex offender registration statutes. Id. Although the Internet connects 
users to information worldwide, there is a dramatic drop in the likelihood of sex offender registry 
information being obtained or sought by individuals outside the state. Id. Furthermore, unlike 
television and radio, the Internet is a passive medium and users must make an affirmative effort 
to retrieve registration information. R at 1251. The Internet merely makes this valuable 
information more accessible to the public. Id
FTior to the injunction, Alaska’s Megan’s Law used the Internet to facilitate the 
notiiication of law enforcement and the public regarding the whereabouts of convicted sex 
of fenders. (J.A. at 142.) Additionally, people outside the State of Alaska have little interest or 
incentive to access tlie sex offender registry information. Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1253. But more 
importantly, the Internet increases the efficiency of dissemination of public information to law 
enforcement and the public by compiling the registration information into one central database. 
Id: see also Patterson, 985 P.2d at 1013 (holding Alaska’s Megan’s Law is not an ex post facto 
statute).
Unlike television and radio, which broadcast information to passive audiences, Alaska’s 
Megan's Law utilizes the Internet, an effective central receptacle for this public information, 
w Inch can be accessed only through an active effort to query the information. Femedeer, 227 
I '.3d at 1253; (J.A. at 142.) As a result, use of the Internet to provide the general location of 
com icted sex offenders, similar to that used in Utah's Megan's Law, would provide considerable 
assistance to law enforcement and the public in the prevention, avoidance, and investigation of
these serious crimes. Femedeer, 227 F.3d at 1253. Therefore, use of the Internet to execute the
notification provisions of Alaska’s Megan’s Law is not excessive in light of usefulness derived 
from the implementation of more efficient communication of public information. Id^
In conclusion, because the absence of a risk-assessment mechanism is not fatal to a 
statute, and the Internet increases the efficiency of disseminating the information, Alaska’s 
Megan’s Law is not excessive in relation to the non-punitive purpose of assisting law 
enforcement and informing to promote public safety. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. at 169. 
Therefore, this factor weighs against finding Alaska’s Megan’s Law has a punitive effect.
4. Although not central to the analysis of punitive effects here, the
undisputed Mendoza-Martinez factors weight toward a civil effect.
The four factors which are not in dispute here arc: (1) whether the sanction has 
historically been regarded as a punishment; (2) whether it comes into play only on a finding of 
scienter; (3) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; and (4) whether an 
alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable to it. Mendoza^ 
Martinez. 372 U.S. at 168-69. All four will be summarily addressed in turn.
First, typically and historically, registration statutes are considered rcguIator>' measures. 
Russell. 124 F.3d at 1089. While the historical analysis of notification statutes have a colorful 
past, shaming punishments such as whipping, pillory, and branding generally involved (1) 
physical involvement of the individual; and (2) direct confrontation with the public. Id at 1091.
In the case at hand, however, the physical participation required by the notice provisions 
of Alaska’s Megan's Law is so nominal that it can hardly be compared to classic shaming 
punishments such as pillory. Id. Furthennore, the clement of direct confrontation between the 
offender and members of the public is non-existent. Id The dissemination of public infonnation 
is not cNecuted for tlie purpose of shaming or punishing the convicted sex offender, as were
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historical shaming crimes, but is carried out to assist law enforcement and protect the public 
from a group of convicted felons that the State of Alaska has determined to merit such exposure. 
Russell. 124 F.3d at 1091. On these grounds, the registration and notification provisions of 
Alaska’s Megan’s Law cannot be historically regarded as punishment. See e.g. Pataki, 120 F.3d 
at 1283-84 (distinguishing banishment and pillory from New York’s Sex Offender Registration 
.Act because burden of notification is imposed only after designated punishment has been ser\'ed. 
not as punishment itself; and no physical restraint, mark, or pain is inflicted by the statute). 
Therefore, this factor weighs against finding that Alaska’s Megan’s Law has a punitive effect.
Second, a finding of scienter requires that the act triggering the sanctions be done with 
willful intent. Black’s Law Dictionary 1347 (Bryan A. Gamer ed., 7th ed.. West 1999). Because 
Alaska's Megan's Law may also be triggered by crimes involving strict liability, such as 
slatutory rape, the statutory sanctions do not become applicable only upon a finding of scienter. 
(.l.A. at 217.); see Alaska Stat. § 12.63.100(l)-(6). Therefore, this factor weighs against finding 
Alaska's Megan's Law has a punitive effect.
Third, if a factor applies only to behavior that is already criminal conduct, it is one more 
factor in the analysis supporting the conclusion that its effect is punitive. Mendoza-Martinez,
372 t I.S. at 168. I lere. Alaska's Megan's Law applies only to “those persons who have been 
convicted of a criminal offense.” (J.A. at 167.) However, this factor alone is insufficient to meet 
the high burden of proof required to show that the effects of Alaska’s Megan’s Law are so 
punitive as to nullify the Alaska Legislature's non-punitive intent. Flemming, 363 U.S. at 612- 
21; see e.g. Femedeer. 227 F.3d at 1253 (concluding that the fifth Mendoza-Martinez factor was 
the only factor that could reasonably weigh toward finding a punitive effect, however it alone 
was insufficient to label Utah's Megan's Law unconstitutional).
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Finally, Respondents concede there is a non-punitive purpose of public safety that can be
rationally connected to Alaska’s Megan’s Law. (J.A. at 167.)
5 The Mendnza-Martinez factors do not meet the burden of proof necessary 
to impeach the Alaska Legislature’s civil statutory scheme.
To discharge the Alaska Legislature’s civil intent, a plaintiff must show that the statutory 
scheme is “so punitive” in effect that it nullifies the legislature's non-punitive intent. WM. 448 
U.S. at 248-49. While the Mendoza-Martinez factors facilitate investigation into whether a 
statute has a punitive effect, in order to show that the scheme is “so punitive, only the clearest 
proof’ will suffice to invalidate a statute on such grounds. Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617. In 
circumstances where this high burden of proof is met, the statutory scheme will be considered 
criminal for constitutional purposes. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361.
In the present case, the Mendoza-Martinez factors fail to meet the high burden of proof 
required to invalidate the Alaska Legislature’s civil intent. Flemming, 363 U.S. at 617. First, 
because Alaska's Megan's Law neither approaches the infamous punishment of imprisonment, 
nor regulates convicted sex offenders’ behavior, it imposes no affirmative disability or restraint. 
Cutshall. 193 F.3d at 474. Second, because a deterrent effect is not dispositive and Alaska’s 
Mcaan's Law affixes no culpability for prior criminal conduct, the traditional aims of 
punishment are not furthered and therefore do not tip this factor toward a finding of a punitive 
effect. Hendricks. 521 U.S. at 36: Urserv. 518 U.S. at 292. Finally, because the Alaska 
Legislature’s purpose for enacting Alaska’s Megan’s Law is reasonably related to the 
notification and registration provisions imposed, it is not excessive. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 
U.S. at 169. These three Mendoza-Martinez factors fail to meet the burden of “clearest proof’ 
that is necessary to impeach a statute that is found to be non-punitive. Flemming. 363 U.S. at 
617. Therefore, the burdens imposed by Alaska's Megan's Law are not punitive, but civil.
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Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49; see e.g. Femedecr. 227 U.S. at 1253 (holding that the burdens
imposed by Utaivs Megan's Law were civil only).
Given that the burden imposed by Alaska’s statutory scheme is not punitive under the
"intent-effects” test, Alaska’s Megan's Law is not an ex post facto statute and can be applied
retroactively to convicted sex offenders. Calder, 3 U.S. at 391; Russell, 124 F.3d at 1083. This
Court should reverse the Ninth Circuit’s erroneous decision and uphold Alaska’s Megan’s Law.
III. I HE STRONG PUBLIC POLICY OF KEEPING CITIZENS INFORMED FAVORS 
UPHOLDING CONNECTICUT AND ALASKA’S MEGAN’S LAW STATUTES.
A. Sex Offenders Pose a Recognized Threat to Society,.
I'his Court acknowledged just earlier this year that sex offenders pose a serious threat to 
society. McKune v. File. 122 S. Ct. 2017. 2024 (2002). When convicted sex offenders reenter 
society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape 
or sexual assault. Id. (citing Sex Offenses and Offenders 1,27 (U.S. Dept, of J., Bureau of J. 
Statistics 1997). The rale of recidivism of untreated sex offenders has been estimated to be as 
high as 80 percent. McKiinc. 122 S. Ct. at 2024. In 1995 alone, an estimated 355,000 rapes and 
sexual a.ssaults occurred nationwide. Id.
According to the U.S. Department of Justice, convicted rape and sexual assault offenders
.ser\ ing time in state prisons report that two-thirds of their victims were under the age of 18, and
58 percent of those - or nearly four in ten imprisoned violent sex offenders - said their victims
were aged 12 or younger. Sex Offenses and Offenders at iii. In 90 percent of the rapes of
children less than 12 years old, the child knew the offender. Id, Sex offenders are substantially
more likelv than other violent offenders to be rearrested for a new violent sex offense. Id, at 26.
¥
1 or example, approximately 8 percent of 2.214 rapists released from prisons in eleven states in
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1983 were rearrested for a new rape within three years, compared to approximately 1 percent of 
released prisoners who serv'ed time for robbery or assault. Sex Offenses and Offenders at 26-27,
These stark statistics help explain the concern over sex offenders living in our midst.
But, e\'en more startling than the numbers are the gruesome stories about real people whose li\-es 
have been tragically touched by a convicted sex offender.
B. Megan's Law Is a Reasonable Response to the Threat Posed by Sex Offenders.
Most notable of the tragic stories that have touched Americans’ lives and raised 
nationwide concerns about sex offenders was the rape and murder of 7-year-oId Megan Kanka, 
the little girl whose name is synonymous with sex offender registry statutes in every state. ^ 
Wagner, Conn. L. Trib. at 1. The sadness over Megan’s death and the deaths of other children at 
the hands of convicted sex offenders prompted a common sense approach to empowering 
citizens to make their own decisions about ensuring their safety.
One former U.S. associate deputy attorney general argues that Megan's Law statutes have 
a “laudatory objective": community self-defense. Bruce Loin. Megan's Law: When a Sex 
Offender Moves in. Is there a Duty to Warn the Community?. 81 A.B.A.J. 38 (1995). Fein 
notes, as did the Paul Court, that “govemment may publicize records of official acts, including 
convictions, so long as the person's freedom of action remains unrestricted.” Id I le underscores 
the fact that broad dissemination of registry information under Megan's Law statutes is 
appropriate given the “wider opportunities for sex offenders to repeat their crimes. Id. Finally. 
Fein offers critics some common sense advice from Justice Jackson's opinion in Terminiello v. 
Chi.. 337 U.S. 1 (1949): doctrinaire logic must be tempered with a little practical wisdom to 
avoid converting “the constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.” Fein. 81 A.B.A.J. at 38.
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We ask this Court to heed Fein and Justice Jackson’s advice, and avoid invalidating two
state laws that could help aN’ert another tragedy similar to Megan Kanka’s fate. Connecticut’s
Megan’s Law docs not violate Respondent's right to due process and Alaska’s Megan’s Law 
does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. Therefore, this case comes down to whether state 
legislatures have a right to empower their citizens by disseminating information that will allow
them to make informed decisions about how’ to protect themselves and their children. The states
of Connecticut and Alaska urge this Court to uphold Connecticut and Alaska’s Megan’s Laws.
CONCLUSION
Connecticut’s Megan’s Law does not deprive Respondent of his right to due process 
because it docs not constitute a stigma nor infringe on a protected liberty or property interest. 
Additionally. Alaska's Megan's Law does not violate the U.S. Constitution's Ex Post Facto 
Clause because it is neither punitive in its intent nor in its effect. For the foregoing reasons, 
Petitioners respectfully request this court REVERSE the judgments of the U.S. Circuit Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit on the due process claim, and the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit on the ex post facto claim.
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